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ABSTRACT

Forwardcontracts allow buyers and sellers of goods to reduce risk by
contracting for sale at a predetermined price and quantity prior to the
actual exchange of goods and payment. While forward contracts are
extensively used in the Western world without restriction, those who
adhere to Islamic law are often constrained by principles intended to
reduce risk, gambling, and usury. These principles can prove overly
restrictive; however, Islamic law restrictions also illuminate the
problems associated with the overly permissive Western system in which
speculators contract in a manner tantamount to gambling-a problem
associated with the recent financial crisis. This Note discusses forward
contracts representing risk-hedging and pure speculation and then
addresses the principles of Islamic law that affect these financial
instruments. The Note next explains the forward contracts that are
permissible under Islamic law and poses two questions: (1) How
important are the motives of the parties involved in the contract? (2) Is
there something that the requirements of Islamic law can teach those
who do not subscribe to the religion? These questions are answered and
conclusions are drawn concerning the permissibility of hedger-hedger
forward contracts under Islamic law and whether Islamic law is overly
restrictive in its treatment of these, concluding that no reasonable
interpretation of Islamic law could deem a purely speculative forward
contract as permissible.
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Do not buy fish in the sea, for it is gharar. The Prophet
forbade sale of what is in the wombs, sale of the contents
of the udders, sale of a slave when he is runaway ....
The Messenger of God forbade the [sale of] the copulation
of the stallion .... He who purchases food shall not sell
it until he [measures]it.
Frank E. Vogel & Samuel L. Hayes, III, Islamic Law
and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return 1
INTRODUCTION
Contracts for the sale of goods that do not exist or are not
deliverable at the time of contract are an important part of the world
economy. These types of sales, known as forward contracts, happen
every day, in every corner of the world, and have served an important
economic function since ancient times. Despite the somewhat
counterintuitive nature of purchasing goods that one cannot
immediately take possession of-an action that seems inherently
risky-the sale of goods that do not yet exist can actually decrease risk
for the buyer and producer by allowing both parties to "hedge their bets"
through mutual agreement.
At first glance, hadiths, 2 like those above, give the impression that
forward contracts are banned completely under Islamic law. Although
an oversimplification, the fundamental problem with the forward
contract is the inherent gharar (risk or uncertainty) that is involved in
the transaction. In more extreme cases a contract might be determined
3
to be maysir (gambling) and is certainly forbidden by Islamic law.
Although the principles of gharar and maysir heavily influence
Islamic financial instruments and transactions, Islam does not mandate
a universal ban on all forward contracts. Indeed, it would pose
enormous difficulties for the world economy if a financial system that
includes 275 institutions operating in over 50 countries 4 refused to deal
at all in forward contracts. Even more significant for the global economy
is the fact that there are 1.57 billion Muslims, 23% of the world's
population, who presumably adhere to Islamic legal principles while
conducting their financial transactions.5
This Note will explore Islamic legal principles that either prohibit or
modify many forward contracts that the Western world takes for

1. See FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES, 111, IsLAMic LAw AND FINANCE:
RELIGION, RISK, AND RETURN 88 (1998) (these hadiths on gharar, which means "risk" or
"uncertainty" in Arabic, are attributed to Ibn Hanbal, Ibn Maja, Bukhari, and Muslim).
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granted. It will explore the different elements that make a forward
contract either permissible or forbidden, and how these elements
depend on one another for a structure that allows transactions that, on
their face, should theoretically be forbidden.
In exploring these issues, this Note will explain how those who
follow Islamic law function in a world economy that relies on forward
contracts of all varieties, and how individuals and institutions
compliant with Islamic law function within such restrictions. This Note
will also address the limits of Islamic law in allowing certain forward
contracts where the parties' motivation is not the traditional purpose of
a forward contract.
It is also the goal of this Note to answer two questions. First, just
how important are the motives of the parties involved in the contract?
Second, is there something that the requirements of Islamic law can
teach those who do not subscribe to the religion? This latter question
will be explored in the context of purely speculative derivatives (PSDs),
a type of contract where neither party is hedging a pre-existing risk and
a contract that, in many ways, is tantamount to gambling-a practice
that, arguably, made a significant contribution to the recent financial
6
crisis.
This Note will begin with a brief discussion of a standard, "Westernstyle" forward contract, followed by an example and explanation of a
purely speculative forward contract. It will then address the principles
of Islamic law that affect these financial instruments, namely gharar
(risk or uncertainty); maysir (gambling or games of chance); and riba
(usury). Following the examination of these three principles, this Note
will explain the two types of permissible Islamic forward contracts and
the ways in which Muslims and Islamic financial institutions navigate
the principles of gharar, maysir, and riba to ensure that an instrument
or transaction is not forbidden. Finally, this Note will provide answers
2. Hadiths are stories or lessons attributed to Mohammed. They form an important
part of Islamic law; one that is subject to interpretation and can be questioned as to its
legitimacy but only on the grounds that the chain of those transmitting the hadith is
suspect. See, e.g. S. E. RAYNER, THE THEORY OF CONTRACTS IN ISLAMIC LAW 1-15 (1991).
3. Contracts like these are not forbidden or subject to gambling laws in America or
many other countries. For an analysis of purely speculative contracts and an argument for
why they should be subject to gambling law, see Timothy E. Lynch, Gambling by Another
Name? The Challenge of Purely Speculative Derivatives, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 69
[hereinafter Gambling by Another Name].
4. See ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A CHALLENGE 2 (M.

Fahim Khan & Mario Porzio eds., 2010).
5. See Mapping the Global Muslim Population:A Report on the Size and Distribution
of
the
World's
Muslim
Population, PEW
FORUM
(Oct.
7,
2009),
http://pewforum.org/Mapping-the-Global-Muslim-Population.aspx
6. See generally Gambling by Another Name?, supra note 3.
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to the two questions posed above and draw the following conclusions: (1)
although Islamic law allows hedger-hedger 7 forward contracts, the law
is overly restrictive in its treatment; and (2) no reasonable
interpretation of Islamic law could conclude that a purely speculative
forward contract is permissible.

I. THE FORWARD CONTRACT
A basic forward contract might take the following form:
[A] wheat farmer has the risk that the spot price of
wheat will decrease by the time [his] wheat is ready to
be harvested and sold. Correspondingly, a flour mill
owner has the risk that the spot price of wheat will
increase by the time he is ready to purchase and
consume the wheat. By entering into a forward contract
at a pre-determined price on an amount of wheat the
farmer is certain to harvest and the mill owner is certain
to want to purchase, both the wheat farmer and the
flour mill have effectively hedged against the possibility
8
that the wheat spot price will move against them.
This is an excellent example because wheat is a fungible
commodity-an essential element in an Islamic forward contract-and if
certain other criteria were met, the above example would be allowed
under Islamic law. 9 Furthermore, this is a "hedger-hedger" contract in
which both parties are attempting to hedge risks, thus serving a
purpose beyond simple profit. 10 This additional utility of risk hedging is
important, and the recognition of this utility is presumably one of the
reasons Islamic jurisprudence allows for certain forward contracts.11

7. See Gambling by Another Name?, supra note 3, at 77 ("Hedger-hedger derivatives
contracts are contracts in which the counterparties each have an equal and opposite risk
to the other's and they hedge their respective risks by contracting, each eliminating his
own pre-existing risk without incurring additional, or speculative, risk in the process.").
8. Id. at 11.
9. See RAYNER, supra note 2, at 134-35 (discussing the fact that unique, i.e. nonfungible, items do not comply with the specificity requirement of salam (forward contract)
sales).
10. See generally Gambling by Another Name?, supra note 3, at 77 for a discussion of
hedger-hedger contracts.
11. See, e.g., RAYNER, supra note 2, at 74 (discussing the retention and Islamization of
pre-Islamic contract models and the application of Ijmd, Qiyds, and Istisldp); NABIL A.
SALEH, UNLAWFUL GAIN AND LEGITIMATE PROFIT IN IsLAMIc LAW: RIBA, GHARAR, AND
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These considerations will be addressed in greater detail in the following
sections dealing with the forms of forward contracts allowed under
Islamic law.
In a broader sense, a forward contract is a derivative: a family of
"financial instrument[s] whose value depends on or is derived from the
performance of a secondary source such as an underlying bond,
The world of derivatives is diverse and
currency, or commodity .. "..",12
complicated; it includes financial instruments and transactions such as
options, swaps, futures, and a myriad of other transactions.13 This Note,
however, will only be exploring forward contracts, or futures 14 and PSDs
of the forward contract variety' 5-a set of circumstances surrounding
forward contracts that will be discussed in the next section.
A forward contract can be an excellent tool for hedging risks.
Although there is a potential for unexpected loss or gain (the gharar
aspect of the transaction), forward contracts are useful and generally
serve both parties by guaranteeing that the producer receives a certain
amount of payment for what he is supplying and that the buyer receives
the goods he desires at a price he is willing to pay.
This Note focuses on two types of forward contracts: (1) a forward
contract involving commodities where the two parties are hedging a
risk; and (2) a PSD forward contract involving commodities where both
parties are not hedging a risk but are simply speculators. This is a
useful comparison, as these two scenarios, despite the fact that they are
the same instrument, ostensibly represent the extreme ends of a
spectrum of reasons for using forward contracts.
II. THE PURELY SPECULATIVE DERIVATIVE
A purely speculative derivative (PSD) can take many forms; it could
be a forward contract or any other type of derivative. 6 The bottom line
with a PSD is that it is purely speculative, and the parties to the
ISLAMIC BANKING 71 (1986) (listing "public heeds" as one of the reasons the bay' salam
contract is permissible under Islamic law).
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 475 (9th ed. 2004).
13. For a comprehensive explanation of derivatives, see Timothy E. Lynch, Derivatives:
A Twenty-First Century Understanding, 43 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1 (2011) [hereinafter
Derivatives].
14. This Note will use the term "forward contract" as a reference to both forward
contracts and futures contracts. A futures contract is simply a type of forward contract
that is traded on an organized exchange and is subject to exchange rules and clearing
procedures. See DON M. CHANCE & ROBERT BROOKS, AN INTRODUCTION TO DERIVATIVES
AND RISK MANAGEMENT 252 (7th ed. 2007).
15. See generally Gambling by Another Name?, supra note 3.
16. See generally id.
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contract are not hedging a pre-existing risk, but are instead simply
17
engaging in the PSD for financial gain.
PSDs go well beyond the typical forward contract in that they
contain enough gharar (risk or uncertainty) to essentially amount to
maysir (gambling). The unavoidable risk that is inherent in any forward
contract between two parties hedging their bets is actually actively
sought by the parties to a PSD. The gharar in a PSD is not an
unfortunate consequence of the transaction, it is the focus of the
transaction.
The following is an example of a PSD contract concerning the price
of oil:
We can easily illustrate the development of a purely
speculative derivatives contract using the price of oil, a
traded
on
contemporary
commodity
commonly
derivatives exchanges. One speculator may predict that
brewing tension in the Middle East will escalate,
limiting oil production and forcing a steep increase in
world oil prices. Seeking to invest in oil without having
to actually own (and store) oil, this speculator can invest
in oil futures in which he buys future oil at a fixed price,
a price which - based on his prediction - will be lower
than the market price of oil at the expiration date of the
futures contract. This speculator would get the most
favorable contract terms from a speculator who predicts
that the tension in the Middle East has not only
artificially increased the price of oil but will soon deescalate resulting in lower prices. These two parties,
because they have heterogeneous expectations, should be
able to negotiate an oil futures contract on terms
acceptable to both.18
In this example, it is not true that one party is producing the oil
while the other party is depending on receiving the oil for sale or use;
instead, neither party ever intends on actually possessing the oil at all.
The two parties will benefit based on their speculation (the accuracy of
their predictions), with one party winning and the other party losing.
The profit to be gained will simply be derived from the final price of the
commodity, which determines the value of the contract.

17. See generally id.
18. Id. at 83.
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The first speculator will win if his predictions are correct because he
purchased the futures contract 19 at a lower price than what it will be
worth once violence in the Middle East escalates and the price of oil
increases. In contrast, the second speculator will win if his predictions
are true, because he sold at a higher price than what the futures
contract will be worth once the violence in the Middle East de-escalates
and the price of oil drops.
At this point, similarities between such purely speculative forward
contracts and gambling are already apparent. Much like betting on a
sports team, those involved in the transaction may have reasons to
believe that one team will prevail over another, but an outcome cannot
be guaranteed. Therefore, when relying on a factor such as "violence in
the Middle East," the outcome is arguably even more difficult to
speculate on.
III. ISLAMIC LEGAL PRINCIPLES
The principles of gharar, maysir, and riba have a significant impact
on Islamic finance. Gharar (risk or uncertainty) affects contracts of all
kinds, from sales contracts to life insurance policies. 20 Similarly, the
prohibition on maysir (gambling and games of chance) can prevent
certain financial activity that is deemed too similar to gambling to be
considered a legitimate transaction. Finally, riba (usury) provides the
basis for Islam's ban on interest on loans and for its ban on any
illegitimate or exploitive gain that a party might derive from a
transaction. These three principles are complex and the extent of their
application is often disputed. This Note will outline these principles to
the extent that they pertain to forward contracts.
A. Gharar(risk or uncertainty)
The Qur'an never mentions gharar specifically. 21 However, maysir
(gambling and games of chance) is banned in the Qur'an, which would
lead one to automatically deem gharar suspect. 22 Gharar is mentioned
numerous times in hadiths in the form of various hypotheticals and

19. Recall that a futures contract is simply a type of forward contract.
20. See generally VOGEL &HAYEs, supranote 1
21. See IsLAMIc BANKING AND FINANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A CHALLENGE, supra
note 4, at 43.
22. SALEH, supra note 11, at 121.
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examples from Mohammed's life. 23 There have been numerous attempts
to give a concise definition of the term gharar. 24 One Islamic law scholar
recommends the observance of three rules when attempting to
understand and avoid gharar in a transaction:
1. There should be no want of knowledge . . . regarding
the existence of the exchanged countervalues.
2. There should be no want of knowledge . .. regarding
the characteristics of the exchanged countervalues or the
identification of their species or knowledge of their
quantities or of the date of future performance, if any.
3. Control of the parties over the exchanged countervalues
25
should be effective.
The aversion to risk that is attributed to Mohammed makes sense.
Because Mohammed was a merchant and experienced in trade, it would
have been quite evident to him the various ways one party to a
transaction could take advantage of another party with less knowledge
or bargaining power. 26 The goal of preventing the exploitation of one
party by another 'led to the elaboration of a rule of general application,
commanding that any transaction should be devoid of uncertainty and
speculation... ,"27
Despite this prohibition against uncertainty, there is an inherent,
unavoidable amount of risk or uncertainty present in every sale or
transaction. 28 As a result, over the centuries, Islamic law has adapted to
the demands of the marketplace, attempting both to facilitate trade and
to simultaneously subject transactions to tests that demand certain
criteria be met. 29

23. See, e.g., id. at 49 (relating a story from Mohammed's time about a Bedouin
tribesman being taken advantage of by a townsman who purchased the tribesman's goods
at a lower than market price).
24. See id. at 50-52.
25. Id. at 52. This definition is Nabil A. Saleh's creation based on his analysis of a
number of Islamic scholars' attempts to define gharar.Also, please note that Saleh's use of
the term jahl (want of knowledge) in his definition has been omitted, as including the
Arabic term for this concept is not important for the purposes of this Note.
26. See id. at 49.
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., id. at 50.
29. See, e.g., id.
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B. Maysir (gamblingand games of chance)
The Qu'ran explicitly forbids gambling: "0 you who believe,
intoxicants, and gambling, and the altars of idols, and the games of
chance are abominations of the devil; you shall avoid them, that you
may succeed." 30 Similarly, the Qur'an also states, "[t]he devil wants to
provoke animosity and hatred among you through intoxicants and
gambling, and to distract you from remembering God, and from
31
observing the Contact Prayers (Salat). Will you then refrain?"
In relation to the sale of goods, hadiths have been variously
interpreted to refer both to maysir and to gharar because they forbid the
sale of "the stroke of the diver" (i.e. anything a diver may return with
after a dive), of unexamined goods a buyer touches (a game played by
merchants in Mohammed's time), and of the sale of goods determined by
the throwing of a rock (another game). 32 The similarities between
gambling and these pre-Islamic game-sales are clear; the buyer will be
forced to purchase, and the seller forced to sell, something of an
33
unknown value.
C. Riba (Usury)
Riba is not simply "the prohibition of interest on credit . . . in
Islamic law it is much more far-reaching." 34 For the purposes of this
Note, only a brief discussion of riba is necessary, but this brief look at
riba and its relation to the sale of goods is important for understanding
the role gharar (risk or uncertainty) plays in Islamic contract.
It is reported in a hadith that Mohammed said, "[p]rofit
accompanies liability for loss (al-kharajbi-l-daman)."35 Thus, "one may
reap the profits (al-kharaj)from possession of property only if one also
36
bears the risks of its loss (al-daman)."
Clearly there exists an essential
link between risk and lawful gain under Islamic law. Interest on loans
is forbidden because the lender is guaranteed his principal in return,
plus additional guaranteed profit. Theoretically, there is no risk

30. QUR'AN 5:90.
31. QUR'AN 5:91.
32. See, e.g., VOGEL &HAYES, supra note 1, at 88-89.
33. Id.
34. See ISLAMIc BANKING AND FINANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A CHALLENGE, supra
note 4, at 46.
35. See id. at 48 (citing to Abu Dawud, Tirmidhi, Nasa'I, and Ibn Maja for this hadith).
36. Id.
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involved here, and this lack of risk makes any profit the lender will gain
37
unlawful-he is only entitled to the repayment of his principal.
Similarly, the sale of a fungible good for another fungible good is
prohibited under Islamic law; there is a perceived lack of risk, and the
main concern is with the chance that riba (usury) may be present. The
use of wheat to purchase an equal amount of wheat in the future is
prohibited under Islamic law because the seller is guaranteed the same
amount of wheat back on the future date set in the contract. 38 This is
why Islamic law requires money to be used when purchasing fungible
items. The idea here is to avoid riba and actually create risk to justify
potential profit-the risk being that the spot price of wheat will increase
or decrease. 39 This brings us back to the original example of a forward
contract involving the wheat farmer and flour mill owner. The farmer
bears the risk that the spot price of wheat will go up and he will have
sold too low, and the mill owner bears the risk that the spot price of
wheat will decrease and he will have purchased too high.
IV. THE ISLAMIC FORWARD CONTRACT-GENERAL PRINCIPLES
"A man asked me to sell him something that I did not
have; Should I go and buy it from the market?" The
Prophet replied: "Donot sell what you do not have."

S. E. Rayner, The Theory of Contracts in Islamic Law

40

On its face, it appears from the hadith above that Islamic law would
prohibit the forward sale of goods, because the seller is dealing in goods
that he does not immediately possess. 41 However, "salam was admitted
by [Islamic law] on the ground of a tradition attributed to the Prophet

37. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 1, at 84.
38. Id. at 85. Careful readers might notice that the wheat in this scenario seems like a
"loan" of wheat. If there is no extra "interest" wheat provided, why would this transaction
not be a valid transaction? The answer appears to lie in the distinction made by Islamic
law between fungible goods and currency. The logic is that money should not be treated as
if it were a commodity. Things like wheat are essential to human existence and will be
consumed, whereas money may be saved or spent and still retain value. Based on this
reasoning, wheat for wheat gives the seller an unfair guarantee of a consumable
commodity in the future; whereas, the guarantee of repayment to a lender simply puts
him back in his original position as if he had never lent the money-a position that is not
considered advantaged. See id. at 82-86, for commentary on this and the logic behind this
conclusion.
39. Id. at 85.
40. RAYNER, supra note 2, at 133 (citing Abai Ddwfid al-Sijistini, al-Sunan, (Cairo n.d.)
4 Vols; III, no. 3503).
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himself and on the ground of consensus ... and because it responds to
public needs."42 Yet, this exception is by no means a green light for any
type of forward contract.
One of the key elements of a permissible forward contract under
Islamic law is specificity. When a forward contract is made for goods,
the goods must exist or be guaranteed to exist. However, if the object of
the contract is the promise that an item will be delivered or
manufactured, then it is not necessary that the item exist at the time
the contract is made. 43 Regardless, the goods being sold must be
fungible (unless it is an istisna contract, described below); and the
quality, quantity, and other defining characteristics of the goods must
be described in detail. 44 Furthermore, payment must be made by the
of the
buyer immediately at the closing of the contract and the delivery
45
goods must be specified for a certain future date and location.
While there are differences among Islamic religious schools about
the various requirements of an Islamic forward contract-some
differences are significant, while others are minute-there are also
common, consistent rules among the schools. 46 Before addressing the
common rules necessary for the purpose of this Note, it is important to
explain the basics of the two types of forward contracts that are
permissible under classical Islamic law.
A. Bay' salam
The salam contract provides for the promise of future delivery of
fungible goods; 47 it is "the sale of a thing which will be delivered to the
purchaser on a future date. That future date must be set at the time of
the contract." 48 Furthermore, payment must occur at the execution of
the contract for delivery of the fungible goods. 49 This stipulation is in
direct contrast with most forward contracts where payment is due at the

41. See SALEH, supra note 11, at 71.
42. Id. See also RAYNER, supra note 2, at 133 (explaining that salam is a type of
forward sale under Islamic law).
43. See RAYNER, supra note 2, at 133.
44. See, e.g., id. at 134.
45. See, e.g., id. at 71-76; see also VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 1, at 122 (one of many
sources to discuss the al-kali' maxim forbidding the sale of "delay for delay," something
that is universally banned by Islamic law, hence the requirement of immediate payment
by the buyer).
46. For a detailed look at the Hanafi, Shafi, Maliki, Hanbali and Ibadi schools and
their criteria for a valid forward contract, see SALEH, supra note 11, at 71-76.
47. See RAYNER, supra note 2, at 133.
48. Id. at 134.
49. See, e.g., VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 1, at 220.
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end of the fixed period stipulated by the contract-not immediately. 50
Indeed, it is a fundamental element of any Islamic contract that the
price of a good be fixed and not subject to any market fluctuation that
51
could alter the value of the contract.
This requirement of immediate payment hag several negative
consequences for the buyer. By requiring immediate payment, the salam
contract exposes the buyer to the risk that the seller will not perform by
delivering the goods. 52 Despite the fact that the goods being sold are
subject to a strict level of specificity, the seller has some control over
what he actually delivers. For instance, if the contract is for one
hundred bushels of Red Fife wheat and the seller has two hundred
bushels, one hundred of which have been sitting in a barn and the other
one hundred freshly harvested, he could choose to deliver the older of
the two. 5 3 This slight variation would not, on its face, violate the
specificity requirements. Additionally under Islamic law, the seller has
54
a certain amount of leeway as to when he actually delivers the goods.
This creates additional uncertainty for the buyer. Depending on the
rules of the Islamic school being followed, the buyer will generally be
required to accept an early or late delivery. 5 Despite the specificity
requirements of Islamic law, there is a certain amount of "good will"
flexibility that is demanded when executing a salam contract.
With regard to the necessary level of specificity of the goods being
sold, we return to the sale of crops to elucidate the standard under
Islamic law. As stated previously, the goods being sold must be fungible,
and the quality, quantity, and other defining characteristics of the goods
must be described in detail. Specificity is required, but there is a point
at which a salam contract might be too specific. It is important to note
that while hadiths allow salam contracts in which one pays in advance
for a specified amount of crop, they "also forbid a salam contract tied to
the crop of a particular field." 56 The key distinction here is the linkage to
a particular field. Logically, there is more risk in a promise that a
certain field may provide the crop than the promise that the crop is
simply provided. This rule must be applied to any particular source,
such as a specific tree, mine, or oil well.

50. See, e.g., id. at 223.
51. Id. at 225-26.
52. Id. at 223.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., id.
55. See, e.g., id. at 146, 223. For examples of the requirement of acceptance of early
delivery, see SALEH, supra note 11, at 72-76.
56. VOGEL & HAYES, supranote 1, at 89.
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The last important aspect of a salam contract is the "parallel" or
"back-to-back" salam. 57 Although not always required in conjunction
with a salam contract, a parallel salam contract is often used to ensure
that there is no riba present in the transaction (from fluctuation in spot
price), and to prevent hoarding-a practice also prohibited by Islamic
law.58
The parallel salam contract is also used because the buyer in the
salam contract cannot sell the expected goods before actually taking
possession of them-he cannot sell the contract (i.e., the rights to the
goods). What the original buyer can do, however, is find an Islamic
financial institution, generally a bank, that will enter into a parallel
salam contract with a third-party buyer. This contract must be identical
to the original salam contract and must be made before the seller is due
59
to deliver the goods.
The parallel salam contract serves some of the risk-hedging
purposes that a typical Western forward contract serves; however, its
usefulness in this regard is limited. 60 By arranging a parallel salam
contract, if original buyer expects the price of the goods he is purchasing
to drop, if the price is already decreasing, or if he decides that he does
not need as much of the commodity as previously thought he can
prevent further loss by selling the goods to a third party through an
Islamic financial institution. The original buyer will still lose money,
but he will "have executed a stop-loss 'short' transaction to prevent any
further loss."61
B. Istisna
Istisnd contracts are for the manufacture of goods and therefore not
bound by the fungibility requirement to which salam contracts must
conform. 62 These contracts can be formed to sell different types of goods,
from t-shirts to airplanes-items that, although mass produced, are
unique with respect to size, brand, material, color, or some other
attribute. The key element is that the goods to be delivered may vary in
57. For an overview of the mechanics of the parallel salam and parallel istisnd
contracts, and two helpful diagrams, see ELISABETH JACKSON-MOORE, THE
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF IsLAMIc BANKING AND FINANCE 41-46 (2009) (taking

standards from the Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial
Institutions (AAOIFI), specifically: AAOIFI Shari'a Standard No. 10 and AAOIFI Shari'a
Standard No. 11).
58. See QUR'AN 104:1-4.
59. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 1, at 146.
60. See generally id. at 246-52.
61. Id. at 249-50 (emphasis added).
62. See, e.g., id.at 220.
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some respect from a comparable item. A producer growing Red Fife
wheat will presumably provide the same wheat as another producer
growing Red Fife wheat, however, one blue jeans manufacturer will not
manufacture the exact same pair of blue jeans as another manufacturer.
The main function of an istisni contract is to finance manufacturing
or production. 63 Aside from the lack of a requirement that the goods be
fungible, an istisnfi contract is essentially identical to a salam contract
in its requirements, in its restrictions, and in the obligations it imposes
on the two parties. Parallel istisnd contracts exist and are used in the
64
same manner as parallel salam contracts.
V. WHAT IS PERMISSIBLE IN ISLAMIC LAW-RESTRICTION AND
MOTIVATION IN HEDGER-HEDGER FORWARD CONTRACTS

The Messenger of God forbade the "sale of the pebble"
[hasah], sale of an object chosen or determined by the
throwing of a pebble], and the sale of gharar.
Frank E. Vogel & Samuel L. Hayes, III, Islamic Law
65
and Finance: Religion, Risk, and Return
This Section will explain the reasoning behind the first conclusion
mentioned in the Introduction: that Islamic law allows hedger-hedger
contracts but is overly restrictive. It will also answer the first question
posed in the Introduction, which asks just how important are the
motives of the parties involved in the contract. It appears, at least in
terms of forward contracts for goods, that Islamic law has found a way
to meet most of the goals of such transactions. Through the mechanisms
of the salam and istisnd contracts, the risk between the two parties is
created at, or reduced to, a level that is considered acceptable under
Islamic law.
As previously mentioned, there is a spectrum of risk within
derivatives, with a hedger-hedger forward contract being at the safest
end and a speculator-speculator forward contract, or PSD, being at the
riskiest end. 66 Hadiths dealing with gharar create certain restrictions,
63. See, e.g., ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: A CHALLENGE,
supra note 4, at 53.
64. JACKSON-MOORE, supra note 57, at 43-46.
65. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 1, at 87 (citing MUSLIM, IBN AL-HAJJAJ AL-NIBABURI,

SAHIH MUSLIM ('Abd Allah Ahmad Abu Zinah ed., 1970)).
66. Id. at 88-90. The authors create their own spectrum of risks by dividing up hadiths
into four categories: "pure speculation," "uncertain outcome," "unknowable future benefit,"
and "inexactitude."
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not to avoid risk per se, but to ensure: (1) knowledge of all aspects of the
sale, and (2) the existence of a concrete, saleable object.67 The risk
related to a contract cannot be considered as "merely one factor affecting
69
price," 68 which is the way risk is treated in the "modern custom."
When evaluating whether a forward contract is valid under Islamic
law in terms of gharar, two questions that must be considered are: (1)
does the object of sale exist concretely?; and (2) is there a lack of
knowledge of any "material aspect of the transaction"?70 Furthermore,
as demonstrated in the section on Islamic forward contracts, payment
must be made immediately, and a time and place for delivery must be
specified in the contract. As opposed to Western forward contracts that
allow people to engage in risky and uncertain contracts, Islamic law
takes a more paternalistic approach and proscribes safer contracts. This
has the effect of both protecting followers of Islam but also restricting
their freedom to contract. 71 This limitation on the freedom to contract is
the overly restrictive aspect of Islamic law; there may be a better way of
approaching forward contracts.
In determining when an unacceptable level of gharar has been
reached, it is probably more useful to approach the question not in
terms of small details (such as, whether a nut is inside or outside of its
shell), 72 but also in terms of drawing a line between reasonable gharar
and prohibited maysir. In other words, in the context of contractswhen does risk taking become gambling?
According to Ibn Taymiyya of the Hanbali school, the most common
interpretations of gharar are overly restrictive. 73 The focus of other
scholars in associating gharar with a test of ignorance and nonexistence
as the defining criteria for allowing or disallowing a contract takes
67. Id. at 89-90 (noting that in certain hadiths "incurring commercial risks-those of
the market or supply and demand-is ...approved and even encouraged").
68. Id. at 90.
69. Id. (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 12, 102-109
(1992)). In this context the authors' reference to "modern custom" within Islam is
synonymous with 'Western custom."
70. Id. at 91; SALEH, supra note 11, at 52. Saleh lists a third element to consider when
determining whether gharar will potentially invalidate a transaction. His first two items
correspond to the two given above, his third is mentioned under the section of this Note
dealing with gharar and involves effective control over the exchanged countervalues;
something that, depending on the Islamic school, is not always considered, but could
invalidate a contract depending on one's interpretation of the relevant hadith.
71. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 1, at 92.
72. SALEH, supra note 11, at 60 (discussing different schools' limitations on contracts,
including the extreme Shafi'i ban on the "sale of fruits or other agricultural products still
in their natural external envelope such as nuts in the shell").
73. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 1, at 92-93. Ibn Taymiyya lived during the thirteenth
and fourteenth Centuries CE. See id.

INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES

19:2

gharar away from its original meaning of risk or uncertainty. 74 Ibn
Taymiyya advocated the approach that gharar should be viewed on a
spectrum, and those who know what they are committing to should be
allowed to do so. 75 Taymiyya defined gharar as that which "hesitates
between soundness and destruction." 76 The emphasis here is on the
distinction between a sound decision, which recognizes risk and factors
it into the decision-making process, and reckless or destructive
behavior.
If one combines the hadiths dealing with gharar with the Qur'an's
ban on maysir as a starting point, then one can easily connect Islamic
law restrictions to the restrictions on gambling in most modern
societies. 77 The immorality and social harms that many societies feel
stem from gambling create a starting point that allows for a more
permissive stance on informed risk taking. 78 If these social harms can be
avoided, why not allow a certain degree of risk taking, and avoid
focusing so heavily on black and white criteria that can invalidate an
otherwise useful contract? Indeed, Taymiyya's views are more conducive
to facilitating many modern financial transactions and are "frequently
relied on by modern scholars of Islamic banking and finance." 79
Taymiyya represents "Position B" on the following table; however, many
classical scholars adopt "Position A."80
Table 1. Classical and Suggested Approaches to Ghararin Forward
Contracts
Scope for valid
consent
(taradin)?

Gharar vs.

Position A

Restrictive

dmant
dominant

Position B

Broad

Maysir
dominant

Evils to avoid?

Maysir

Gharar

I

Ignorance,

noince
nonexistence
Enmity,
distraction from
prayer

Source: FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES, III, ISLAMIC LAW
FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK, AND RETURN 88, 91 tbl.4-b (1998).
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Id. at 92-93.
77. Id. at 90.
78. See id. at 90-91.
79. Id. at 93.
80. Id. at 90-93.
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This suggested approach to gharar and forward contracts moves
away from small technicalities built within other approaches, and
focuses more on the motivation of the parties and the social harm that
may or may not be caused by the transaction. Applying Islamic law in
this fashion would allow more flexible forward contracts and would
allow risk to be factored into the price. Indeed, if a certain amount of
risk is required in order to avoid riba and produce lawful gain, then why
not reward parties by allowing them, for instance, to trade in fungibles?
Furthermore, the negative consequences for the buyer, produced by
requiring him to tender immediate payment, can be eliminated if the
criteria for a valid contract turned on the soundness of the parties'
reasoning and not on simple black-and-white distinctions.
The overly restrictive nature of Islamic law has further
ramifications for those who may want to hedge risks. Based on the rules
discussed in this Note, Islamic law would clearly prohibit the sale of
other derivatives that might be beneficially used to mitigate economic
damage to an individual. Although beyond the scope of this Note,
weather derivatives, for example, would not be allowed under standard
Islamic law rules dealing with contract.8 1
By returning to the example of a wheat farmer looking to hedge
risk, we can evaluate the risks involved in weather derivatives. For
example, a farmer may purchase weather derivatives that provide him
payment if the amount of rainfall is below a certain point during the
year, where the hedging counterparty to this derivative would be an
82
individual who decides he has an economic interest in dry weather.
Clearly, Islamic law would prohibit this type of contract based on the
amount of gharar involved; but, what if this was economically rational
and actually reduced the risk for both hedging parties involved? It is
possible that a more relaxed interpretation of Islamic law based on the
parties' motives might allow such a contract. However, this conclusion
would require an extremely liberal view of hundreds of years of Islamic
law.
Of course, reinterpreting Islamic law in a more liberal way brings
with it the danger of eliminating the very purpose of the restrictions.
Islamic law seeks to avoid the exploitation of individuals, to reduce risk,
and to prevent people and financial institutions from making poor
83
decisions and using their money in an unproductive manner.
81. See Lynch, Derivatives, supranote 13, for more information on weather derivatives.
82. One can use their imagination as to who might have an interest in this; a
construction contractor or a farmer growing crops that depend on dry weather and little
rainfall are possible examples.
83. See VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 1, at 77-83 (providing an overview of the goals of
Islamic law in imposing restrictions on the freedom to contract).
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The classical law and the hadiths are the obvious counterargument
to a less restrictive approach. Despite its anachronistic nature, the story
of the Bedouin herder, whose lack of knowledge allowed him to be taken
advantage of by townspeople doing business with him outside of the city
market,8 4 is still relevant in today's world. Uncertainty is something
that has never left and will never leave financial transactions; it merely
changes shape as society and technology advance. The freedom to
contract is something that is prized by Western society, but there is a
legitimate argument to be made that the social harm caused by the lack
of knowledge present in many contracts warrants restriction.
VI. PURELY SPECULATIVE FORWARD CONTRACTS ARE FORBIDDEN UNDER
ISLAMIC LAW-WHAT CAN BE LEARNED FROM THIS?
This Section will address the second conclusion in the introduction:
that no reasonable interpretation of Islamic law could conclude that a
purely speculative forward contract is permissible. It will also answer
the question of whether there is something to be learned from Islamic
law by those who do not follow Islam.
A forward contract of a purely speculative nature, such as a PSD,
would be banned under classical Islamic law for two reasons. First, it
would simply not meet the requirements of a permissible forward sale,
which are outlined in salam and istisnd contracts. Regardless of the
details and disputes among the schools, the bottom line is that payment
in a purely speculative forward contract cannot be tendered at the
closing of the contract, and this violates the clear rule that payment
must be made for the goods immediately. Second, neither party to the
contract has the intention of ever possessing or delivering the goods.
The buyer does not intend to receive the goods, the seller does not
possess the goods-now or in the future, and the seller has no intention
of delivering the goods.
The fact that Islamic law mandates that a delivery date be specified
makes it clear that forward contracts under Islamic law were never
intended to be of a purely speculative nature. The ability of speculators
to turn a profit depends upon the aleatory nature of their contracts, and
upon the ease of buying and selling these contracts quickly, without
possessing the actual goods, to turn a profit. That is, "the condition that
the object be capable of delivery or execution in Islamic law is also a
judicial condition that the object must be in the ownership of the person

84. See SALEH, supra note 11, at 49.
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intending to dispose of it, or that it must be capable of being
85
performed."
It is clear that Islamic law allows forward contracts where actual
delivery is intended. Often, as with a parallel salam or istisnd contract,
an immediate buyer is required, thus eliminating the chance that a
party to a forward contract might benefit from a hike in the price of the
commodity and ensuring that there is a real beneficiary who receives
the goods. Although the criteria for executing a legitimate forward
contract varies among the schools, the universal deliverability
requirement guarantees that PSD forward contracts are not present in
transactions compliant with Islamic law.
Even with a more liberal interpretation of the restrictions on
Islamic forward contracts, such as the approach advocated by Ibn
Taymiyya, the motives of pure speculators would not pass muster.
Islamic law's prohibition on maysir would prevent pure speculators with
no intention of hedging a risk from, essentially, gambling with their
money.86
In this respect, Islamic law allows parties to benefit from the
forward sale of goods but denies them the opportunity to engage in
activity that is ostensibly gambling. In the wake of the recent financial
crisis and the numerous PSDs that contributed to or accelerated the
process, some of Islamic law's restrictions on pure speculation may not
be'a negative approach for others to consider.
It is not the intention of this Note to advocate a complete overhaul
of the Western forward contract tradition-as mentioned previously,
Islamic law often goes too far and is burdensome. It is noteworthy,
however, that one of the major religions of the world has banned risky
PSDs, both in the technical aspects of the transaction and also in
relation to the motives of the contracting parties.
There is a convincing argument to be made that PSDs-in the
context of this Note purely speculative forward contracts-are in fact
gambling and should be governed by gambling law.8 7 Islamic law has
already taken this step, and despite the temporally distant origins of its
approach, may be well ahead of Western society's treatment of such
contracts. All societies impose restrictions on behavior that results in
social harm, especially if that harm has a wide reaching effect, but the
justification for those restrictions vary. The fact that religion is the
85. RAYNER, supra note 2, at 139.
86. See generally Gambling by Another Name?, supra note 3, for an in depth look at
how pure speculators are often banks, hedge funds, or municipalities that are gambling
with the money of others who are not aware how their money is being used. This activity
can cause great social harm, something that Islamic law seeks to prevent.
87. See id. for an argument that gambling law should be applied to PSDs.
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source for Islamic law does not preclude the ability of secular law
reaching the same conclusions; it simply must have a different rationale
to justify the restrictions.
CONCLUSION

There is a debate among Muslims about whether engaging in
modern financial practices is a harmless adaptation to a changing
world, or if adaptation is foregoing morality under "compulsion exerted
by life in a system shaped by alien values."8 8 There are certainly
Muslims who consider a reinterpretation of Islamic law to be
89
appropriate and realistic; however, these Muslims are in the minority.
A majority of Muslims adhere to classical Islamic law-as evidenced
simply by the fact that Islamic banking and Islamic financial
instruments have been developed, currently exist, and are still in use.
The fact that "Islamic finance" exists proves that the classical Islamic
law "still command[s] overwhelming authority and prestige." 90 The goal
is "not to replace the classical law but to apply it."91
However, it would not be unreasonable for Islamic law to take a
more motive-based approach when applying its doctrine; nor would it be
unreasonable for Western society to apply a more morality-based
approach to financial transactions-even though these risky
transactions may not actually be the type of gambling that takes place
in a casino. Although it might be simpler to apply an objective test
based upon immediate payment, delivery details, and strict
requirements for description of the goods, it would not be impossible for
Islamic law to maintain its emphasis on morality, and to evaluate
parties' intentions and motives in court-enforcing contracts that
avoided gharar, maysir, and riba, and invalidating contracts too similar
to gambling. Indeed, that was the way the common law was applied in
the nineteenth century in the United States. 92 It was not until later,
shortly before the Great Depression, that courts in the United States
began upholding speculator-speculator contracts.

88. VOGEL & HAYES, supranote 1, at 25.
89. See id.
90. Id. at 25-26. Vogel argues that "[i]f a drastic liberalizing reinterpretation of the
Qur'anic ban on interest and other strictures were broadly accepted by religious Muslims,
Islamic banking and finance would have little purpose. Advocates do not dream of a future
alignment with conventional practice, but of successfully asserting their difference with it.
If necessary, they will create a permanently distinct sphere of finance."
91. Id.
92. See Gambling by Another Name?, supra note 3.
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It is clear that there have been shifts in both Islamic jurisprudence
and Western jurisprudence as to the treatment of forward contractsneither system is impervious to reinterpretation and adjustment.93 In
terms of possible derivatives, if a hedger-hedger forward contract is on
the most economically responsible, restrictive end of a spectrum, and a
speculator-speculator forward contract is on the most irresponsible,
permissive end, then Islamic law goes too far in constraining the
restrictive side and Western tradition allows too much leeway on the
permissive side. Perhaps the right balance is somewhere in the middle.

93. Recall the increased use of Ibn Taymiyya's position among modern Islamic
financial institutions. Further, the salam and istisna contracts are evidence of Islamic
law's flexibility in adapting to the needs of businesses and individuals. Scholars since the
classical period have noted that these well-established contracts are reasonable and
helpful exceptions to overly restrictive rules.

